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Mental health commissioning: master or subject of change? 
 
 
Purpose 
To explore change within the commissioning of third sector mental health services in 
England.  
Methodology 
A case study methodology based on survey and interview data of a sample of third sector 
organisations and commissioners within an English conurbation.  
Findings 
Normative commissioning models based on sequential cycles were not fully implemented 
with the main focus being on the procurement and contracting elements. There were 
examples of the process being an enabler of service improvement but overall 
commissioners seemed limited in their ability to bring about whole system change. Barriers 
included commissioners’ capacity and competence, ineffectual systems within their 
organisations, and fragmentation in commissioning processes between user groups, 
organisations and sectors. 
Research limitations 
The case study conurbation may not represent practice in all urban areas of England and 
there may be particular issues of difference within rural localities. The view of private and 
public sector providers and those working in Commissioning Support Units were not sought 
Practical implications 
To lead whole system change   the commissioning function needs to be adequately 
resourced and skilled with better integration across public sector functions and 
organisations. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on implementing the full commissioning 
cycle, including the engagement of relevant stakeholders throughout the process and the 
practical application of outcomes. 
Originality 
This research adds to the limited body of empirical work regarding commissioning in mental 
health. 
Key words 
Mental health, commissioning, change, third sector, integration, outcomes. 
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Classification 
Research 
Introduction 
Successive governments in England have promoted commissioning as the process through 
which public sector services will be planned and overseen. Whilst no one definition or 
model of commissioning dominates, they are commonly based around a ‘cycle of assessing 
the needs of people in an area, designing and then securing an appropriate service’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2006, p 4; Bovaird et al., 2012). Different sectors have developed their own 
approaches, and the recommended models within sectors have been subject to change over 
time. For example, in health care there was a progressive move to separate organisations 
responsible for the purchasing function from the delivery of services (DH, 2009) whereas 
local authorities have been able to retain both functions in principle, even if the majority of 
their direct services have been outsourced in practice. Across all sectors there has been a 
move towards greater diversity of provision in which public, private and third sector 
organisations (TSOsi) compete either for or in the market (Gash and Roos, 2012). Policy then 
portrays commissioners as the strategic overseers of a mixed economy of welfare, using 
their purchasing and influencing power to ensure that the publicly funded system is shaped 
to achieve the required outcomes within the resources available. It is worth noting that 
other governments have different interpretations of the commissioning cycle –for example 
the Scottish Government (2012) emphasises that securing the supply should be based on 
‘partnership’ rather than ‘procurement’. 
This commissioning-led approach to strategic change has been promoted in mental health. 
The lead role for commissioning of clinical health services has been taken by various local 
and regional bodies within the national health service (NHS), for social care by local 
authorities, and for public health by the NHS and now local authorities.. Mental health 
commissioners are charged with leading the fight locally for parity with other patient and 
user groups, facilitating the move to a ‘well-being’ rather than ‘disease focused model’, and 
to ensure that care planning and population led strategies are co-produced with individual 
and their communities (DH, 2012a, b). They are expected to act as leaders who use both 
‘hard’ (in the form of tenders, contracts and financial incentives) and ‘soft’ (in the form of 
lobbying, inspiring and influencing) approaches to steer and co-ordinate the action of the 
various players (NHS England, 2014). This includes partnership working with those agencies 
outside of the mental health or indeed health or social care sector, with increasing 
recognition of the vital role played by statutory and community agencies working in 
housing, employment and criminal justice in providing more integrated care (Seymour, 
2010, DH, 2011). The market of clinical services over which commissioners preside has 
largely been retained by the public sector through NHS mental health trusts and now mental 
health NHS foundation trusts. Private and third sector providers have significant 
involvement in particular aspects of delivery such as residential, specialist treatment, home 
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support and advocacy services (Mental Health Strategies, 2012), and successive 
governments have been keen to enhance this diversity through attempts to introduce 
competitive procurement, payment systems and individually held budgets. TSOs are also 
seen as important partners for the wider commissioning process, through their community 
networks and understanding of specialist needs (DH, 2006, DH, 2012a). 
This article seeks to consider three key questions in relation to change and commissioning 
from the perspectives of TSOs who work in mental health and commissioners of health and 
social care services, with the overall aim of understanding the extent to which 
commissioning has been able to act as a catalyst for change – 
How has commissioning changed the strategic planning and purchasing of mental health 
services?  
How has commissioning changed the way in which the mental health system operates?  
What has limited the ability of commissioning to achieve the changes expected within 
national policy?  
The article begins with an overview of mental health commissioning in England and finishes 
with a discussion informed by change management theory. 
Commissioning in mental health 
Mental health services have been subject to the various restructures of commissioning that 
have befallen the wider health and social care system. Primary Care Groups and then Trusts 
were given lead responsibility for commissioning both clinical and public health services in 
the 2000’s, with commissioning of specialist services such as forensic services being retained 
by Strategic Health Authorities. Following the election of the coalition government in 2010 
the majority of local clinical services are now purchased by Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(CCG) led by GPs, specialist health services by the national body NHS England, and public 
mental health services by Local Authorities. Commissioning Support Units (CSUs) have been 
created to provide support to CCGs in particular with a range of commissioning related 
activities, including communication, engagement, procurement and contract management. 
CCGs are not required though to purchase this support from their local or indeed any CSUs, 
and from 2016 they will operate as autonomous businesses within a commissioning support 
market. A number of concerns have been raised regarding these collective changes, 
including the ability of GPs to take on these new and very different responsibilities, the 
potential for fragmentation due to a new set of boundaries and inter-organisational 
relationships, and the danger that local authorities will divert the public health funding to 
other priorities (APPG, 2012). Whilst it was called by a different name, local authorities were 
effectively required to adopt a commissioning approach to social care mental health 
services through the community care reforms of the 1990’s, and have retained this 
responsibility throughout the various NHS changes. In many local areas a proportion of 
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social care commissioning responsibility has been delegated to the NHS through the use of 
Health Act flexibilities, with in 2007/8 £1.4 billion (out of a total spend of £10.3 billion across 
health and social care) being administered through pooled funds (Audit Commission, 2009). 
Direct payments, in which the person accessing services effectively takes responsibility for 
‘micro-commissioning’ their own care package, has had a slower uptake in mental health 
than in other service areas (Fernandez et al, 2007). It continues to be promoted though, and 
has been extended to personal health budgets through a national pilot in which the people 
accessing mental health services were found to benefit in particular (Jones et al, 2013). 
National guidance regarding the commissioning of mental health services has largely been 
targeted towards health, or health and social commissioners (e.g. Bennett et al, 2012, 
NMHDU, 2009, NICE, 2011). The proposed cycles are variants of those outlined above, with 
an expectation that they will operate at different levels – the individual person, the GP 
practice, and for whole populations. In comparison to other models there is a more explicit 
emphasis on managing risk and putting people who receive services at the centre of the 
process. The latter has been described as a vital component due to statutory and regulatory 
requirements, greater likelihood that people will receive a service that is value to them, and 
previous evidence that it results in essential improvements being achieved (NMHDU, 2011). 
‘Values based’ approaches emphasise the importance of explicitly stating the values as well 
as evidence base that lie behind decision making (Carter et al, 2011). These are seen to 
support a ‘move away from the dominance of clinician experience and scientific evidence 
that has been prioritised over service user values and experience in traditional 
commissioning processes’ (Perry et al, 2013, p6). Values are also part of the rationale 
behind the ‘mental wellbeing’ commissioning model promoted by Heginbotham and 
Newbigging (2014). This seeks to take a whole life approach which ‘strengthens protective 
factors and reduces risk factors’ (p6) by building individual resilience and support networks 
from childhood (and therefore has a strong correlation with ‘asset based approaches’ e.g. 
IDEA, 2010). Finally, whilst not mental health specific, it is worth also mentioning 
‘intelligent’ and ‘outcomes based’ commissioning as they have been influential in this 
sector. The former arose out of work by the Audit Commission (2007) regarding 
engagement of the third sector in the commissioning process and identifies key 
opportunities and challenges for this to occur at different stages in the cycle. Outcome 
based commissioning is a generic term that has been deployed by a number of 
commentators, think tanks and public bodies to imply that commissioners should be 
focused on the impacts not the process or mechanisms of delivery (see e.g. Bovaird and 
Davies, 2011). 
Methodology 
The research was based in a case study conurbation which incorporated three local 
authorities and five clinical commissioning groups (Yin, 2009). An online survey was 
completed of TSOs involved in the mental health field, with potential respondents being 
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identified through lists or databases of mental health organisations held by local 
infrastructure bodies, discussions with local TSO representative bodies and mental health 
commissioners, and through searches via the internet. Building on the survey responses a 
purposive sample was developed which reflected the range of mental health services 
provided by third sector organisations in the conurbation. These services were primarily – 
advocacy and representation, social care (including domiciliary care, residential care and day 
activities), supported housing, employment, advice, and support for carers. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with a sample of 23 TSOs in mid-late 2013. Through the 
interviews and general research process, six individual commissioners were identified and 
agreed to be interviewed. These commissioners worked in local authorities or CCGs, and 
included those from a social care, supporting people and general practice background. 
Interviews were conducted in a similar manner, and in the same period, using a revised 
semi-structured interview schedule. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and key data 
entered into a spread sheet matrix organised according to identified themes (Robson, 2011). 
Ethical approval was granted through the University of Birmingham. The principle 
limitations of the study were that the case study conurbation may not represent practice in 
all areas of England and there may be particular issues of difference within rural localities. 
The view of private and public sector providers and those working in Commissioning 
Support Units were not sought. TSO (rather than public or private sector) perspectives were 
focused on due to the emphasis in national mental health and commissioning policies on 
their engagement throughout the process. Furthermore many of the individuals leading the 
TSOs had worked in the locality since before commissioning was formally introduced in 
national policy and could therefore provide comment on how it has shaped - or not - public 
sector behaviour. 
Findings 
How has commissioning changed the strategic planning and purchasing of mental health 
services?  
Few respondents, including those who worked as commissioners, reported that the 
expected cyclical model had been achieved in practice, and most highlighted that 
commissioning in the real world is much messier than the neat normative models would 
suggest. The general consensus was that there had been some improvement in needs 
analysis and in the public sector being more aware of how its resources were actually being 
used, but that overall commissioners were far from achieving the managed process that is 
envisaged in national guidance summarised earlier. GP commissioners highlighted that it 
was still early days in their tenure, and recognised that other stakeholders may not have 
seen any difference as yet 
I would fully understand if the third sector organisations didn’t think it had felt any 
different at this stage, because like any commissioning cycle, we’ve got to go 
through the first bits before we can get round to redesign. (CCG Lead) 
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The aspect of the cycle that was seen to have changed the most was procurement and 
contracting. Indeed many TSO participants effectively saw commissioning as being limited to 
this activity and struggled to respond with any depth to questions regarding other aspects of 
the cycle. It became clear that for them the term ‘commissioning’ was commonly used to 
denote the purchasing process rather than its broader considerations – in other words ‘to 
be commissioned’ rather than ‘a commissioning cycle’. Financial arrangements in the pre-
commissioning era were described as being much looser, with grants (which had relatively 
few conditions) being the predominant funding mechanism. Under commissioning the 
financial relationship was more formal and based on contractual agreements with 
accompanying specifications and more thorough (and therefor onerous) monitoring 
requirements. Competitive tendering was also more common (although not as ubiquitous as 
expected), with TSOs having to compete for funding alongside private and NHS providers. 
Previous research (e.g. McMillan, 2010) has suggested that third sector organisations often 
have a negative view of a competitive funding process, and this was mirrored in the views of 
some participants  
They could develop partnerships and frameworks where they’re constantly working 
to evolve and grow the quality of the services that are delivered.  But they would 
rather spend millions of pounds going through a procurement exercise than actually 
saying “No, let’s do a framework and let’s work with a select number of providers to 
deliver our services for the future.” (TSO) 
Overall though, the formalisation of the new procurement arrangements was welcomed. 
TSOs felt clearer about what was expected of them and how they were expected to 
demonstrate impact and contractual agreements were seen as more binding than yearly 
grant arrangements. Competitive tendering could be challenging and time-consuming 
process, particularly for smaller organisations, however it also meant that there was an 
opportunity for innovation and organisational growth. Commissioners saw procurement as 
a component rather than the whole of the commissioning process. They recognised the 
tension between giving providers sufficient certainty that they could deliver new service 
models whilst also periodically giving other providers the opportunity to propose new 
approaches. The impression was of a dynamic and messy process, in which there were 
multiple procurement cycles being undertaken at any one time.  
How has commissioning changed the way in which the mental health system operates? 
Commissioning was largely seen to have encouraged the public sector to be more aware of 
how its resources were being used and to have facilitated, or at the very least not 
prevented, improvement of individual services. However participants were less convinced 
that commissioning had had been able to improve the mental health system as a whole, and 
was seen as some as being more of a hindrance than a help  
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But I look back, and over the last four years, as far as I can see, there has been no 
new service type…. The creativity has gone. (TSO) 
Whilst not always seen to be exemplary in partnership working in their own practice (see 
below) commissioners were described as being supporters for integration in the services 
purchased. In one locality the commissioner had developed a hub that facilitated joint 
working between different TSOs, and in other was described as being an individual 
champion for better integration. It was thought that GPs’ connection with patients would 
enable them to recognise the importance of inter-agency co-ordination, and such a view 
was summarised by one GP commissioner as follows  
You pull together the builder, the architect and the plumber into an alliance to put 
up your house. In health we have this particular resistance to pulling people together 
and to holding them to account as a group.  And actually I think without a doubt in 
my mind, it is the way forward. (CCG Lead) 
Whilst commissioners were clear about the need to better integrate frontline services and 
were personally committed to achieving it, they were realistic about the progress that had 
actually been made due to the previous fragmented approaches to the planning and 
delivery of services. This was echoed by a number of the TSO participants, both in relation 
to the integration within specialist mental health services and between mental health and 
other service areas. In relation to the latter, there were concerns that those with needs that 
were more complex and somewhat different to the general users of mental health services 
were particularly poorly served.   
There were though also examples of services successfully co-ordinating their responses, and 
in particular between TSOs and NHS providers.  Larger TSOs also recognised that they had at 
times developed their own service silos, and were seeking to address these in future as a 
means to make their own offer more efficient. 
The language of outcomes appeared to be being adopted by commissioners, however for 
most participants it was yet to be practically translated into commissioning processes and 
this to considerable frustration for TSOs. In addition, many TSOs believed that they were 
better able to understand the outcomes that would be would be appropriate for their 
beneficiaries and how to incorporate these into their practice. Others argued that all parties 
find it difficult to define, operationalize and measure outcomes, and it is a struggle to 
achieve such an approach in reality. Another issue was that care managers had the key role 
in specifying the outcomes required from individual packages, and they were not always as 
engaged with this agenda as their commissioners  
On the ground the service orders come through saying get this person out of bed, 
get them fed, get them washed, rather than saying to the supplier, well what you’re 
looking to do is get this person independent. (TSO) 
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Many TSOs, including obviously those who were involved in its delivery, noted that the 
commissioning of Improving Access to Psychological Therapy services had a strong focus on 
outcomes, and the nationally developed performance framework sought to capture clinical 
recovery alongside access and throughput measurements. There were also examples of 
existing services being redesigned to have a greater focus on outcomes. For example, an 
inward focused sheltered employment scheme had become more focused on encouraging 
people into mainstream and sustainable employment.  
What has limited the ability of commissioning to achieve the changes expected within 
national policy?  
There are a range of different ‘softer’ influencing strategies that commissioners can deploy 
when trying to influence change – for example they can develop a normative vision that 
inspires, use their networks to link together relevant individuals and services, and draw 
upon the credibility arising from personal experience and professional expertise (NHS 
England 2014). All of these were reported to some degree by the TSO participants, however 
the main change approaches highlighted were those based on the allocation of funding and 
contracting process.  This reflects the market-based logic that underpins the commissioning 
models in England in which the purchaser-provider split has been seen as sacrosanct in 
healthcare and local authorities have externalised much of their direct services (Gash & 
Roos 2012). However, simply having the funding that organisations rely upon for their 
survival does not by itself guarantee that a purchaser will be able to dictate how they 
operate. Commissioners are themselves accountable for a challenging set of deliverables, 
and rely on providers to achieve these on their behalf highlighting a strong degree of mutual 
dependency and arguably diluting the power of the purchasers (Lonsdale, 2012). Markets 
require sufficient diversity to bring competitive pressure, the opportunity for new entrants 
to bring innovation, and the sanction of expulsion for organisations or services that are not 
seen to be delivering (Le, Grand 2009). Participants in this study highlighted that NHS 
providers continue to dominate the local market place and from their perspectives this 
monopoly over many clinical services watered down the purchasing power.  Furthermore, 
managing this relationship soaked up much of the commissioners’ time and  left them little 
energy or capacity to develop the areas of service that the TSOs were engaged in. TSOs also 
had different proportions of the market, with larger ones (including those with no historical 
connection with the locality) being seen as better able to participate in competitive 
tendering. This led to concerns regarding the demise of smaller TSOs who actually exhibited 
the features that commissioners favour, such as specialist knowledge, community 
engagement and holistic working. 
The competence of the public sector to undertake commissioning was raised by most TSOs. 
Whilst some individuals were praised for their ability to make a positive change, there were 
also commissioners who were seen to be lacking and therefore had a negative influence. It 
was striking in this regard how much impact the individual commissioner’s attitude and 
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approach was thought to make. Unsurprisingly perhaps commissioners did not flag up 
personal competence as an issue, although there was notable variation in what experience 
or knowledge they thought would be necessary for someone to take on a commissioning 
role. There was also considerable difference of opinion regarding what type of relationship 
they would expect to have with TSOs in comparison to other providers. Linked to this, a 
number of commissioners emphasised the importance of values in their work and the 
importance of this being a driver of commissioner behaviour. Alongside competence was 
the major issue of capacity, with commissioners and TSOs emphasising that demands placed 
on commissioners outweighed their available time. This meant that reviews of services or 
pathways were delayed as commissioners were not able to engage. Numerous complaints 
were also made regarding the competence of the organisation in which commissioners were 
based, particularly in relation to keeping to agreed deadlines for tenders, maintaining 
records, and paying bills. These perceived organisational failings appeared to tarnish the 
good work of individual commissioners - 
 First they sent us a ridiculous letter saying we’d been awarded XX a year, the next 
day they emailed saying, “Oh, we’ve sent you the wrong letter”.  Then I couldn’t get 
hold of anybody to find out what they meant, did they mean we hadn’t been 
awarded anything? (TSO) 
Commissioners were often described as being fragmented in their structures and practices. 
TSOs whose services were procured by more than one public sector body, or indeed more 
than one department within a single public sector body, had common experiences of this 
being dis-jointed. This appeared to result from commissioners having different outcomes 
frameworks, budgets and performance measurements and their personal interests and 
priorities. The inter-organisational fragmentation included the NHS, in which all the bodies 
are in principle part of the same overall ‘family’. It was also replicated between 
commissioners in the same organisations who were responsible for planning and purchasing 
services for different user groups 
We’ve got an adult section, a young carers section and a young adult carers section, 
and we had a commissioner for the young carers section and then we had another 
commissioner for the adult section, which was ridiculous. (TSO) 
This internal separation was observed by TSOs as leading to commissioners being in 
competition regarding funding – either to attract new streams or to transfer responsibility 
to other commissioners. This led to disputes between commissioners about who should pay 
for a contracted service and TSOs being passed between organisations and teams. TSOs also 
reported a lack of understanding or interest by commissioners in considering the public 
sector purse as a whole, with numerous examples of duplication in spending and initiatives 
that would reduce the costs to one commissioning budget whilst increasing the expenditure 
for another- 
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They now don’t have to spend this money, but of course, the Local Authority don’t 
really care about that because it isn’t their money that I’m preventing from being 
spent... (TSO) 
The Health Authority thought it was great because at that time they renegotiated 
their Section 75 money with the Council so they weren’t paying anything.  So no 
wonder the mental health commissioner from the Trust thought it was wonderful, 
but it was costing more for less. Mad. (TSO) 
The commissioners also recognised that their structures and processes were far from 
integrated. The most recent restructures had led in one area to health commissioners being 
now based within the Council, and it was hoped that the informal contacts that this would 
foster may lead to better joint working in practice. One TSO reported that the downsizing of 
the commissioning team may have addressed the previous fragmentation through replacing 
multiple commissioners with just one person, however the viability of such an arrangement 
in the long term could be questioned in light of the comments about capacity above.  
Adding to these partnership difficulties were the periodic internal restructurings, 
organisational mergers and whole system changes within the public sector. This means that 
settlements that had been reached between the previous commissioners were often 
disregarded, and agreements regarding responsibility for funding and contracts had to be 
renegotiated between the new commissioners: 
I think that’s being challenged now that Public Health have gone into Social Care, 
there’s a row going on about who’s doing the commissioning. (TSO) 
The process of setting up new organisations, developing alternative commissioning 
structures and appointing individuals to commissioning roles caused uncertainty and delay. 
This meant that key decisions regarding funding were not being made during the period in 
which the research was carried out, and short-term agreements were being used to give the 
commissioners more time. This was unsettling for TSOs, and again meant that they could 
not proceed with service reviews and improvements. The churn within commissioning 
functions also disrupted established personal relationships, and this was made worse by a 
perceived lack of good information and contractual systems within the public sector. This 
meant that TSOs often had to repeatedly provide basic information on their services and 
what they had been commissioned to provide, and to educate new commissioners on the 
underlying thinking behind local strategies. Commissioners, many of whom had been 
subject to personal uncertainty regarding their employment and future careers, shared 
many of these concerns in relation to the continual change. However they were also largely 
optimistic that the new arrangements could be a positive change, for example through 
enabling greater engagement of clinicians in commissioning, local authorities to have a 
broader role in promoting mental wellbeing, and people accessing services to be more in 
control through their managing their own budgets. 
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Discussion 
English mental health policy does not solely place responsibility for change on the heads of 
commissioners, and the implementation guidance emphasises that providers and other 
public sector functions must also play their part (DH, 2012a). However, commissioners are 
expected to play a key role in steering the direction of their local system by deciding on 
priorities for funding, selecting models and providers, and monitoring the outcomes (DH, 
2011, NHS England, 2014). This study suggests that through transactional power based on 
their control of the financial flow and more transformational approaches based on visioning 
and trusting relationships, commissioners are able to exert influence over mental health 
services delivered by the third sector. Commissioning as a cyclical method of planning and 
purchasing services does not appear to be fully implemented, and there was no particular 
model of mental health commissioning that was consistently and explicitly preferred over 
another. From the perspectives of TSOs, commissioners’ ability to achieve positive change 
was greatly limited by their capacity and competence, by ineffectual systems within their 
organisations, and fragmentation between commissioning processes for different sectors 
and user groups. Despite these restrictions, and the dominance of NHS providers in local 
market places, there were examples of commissioners and commissioning changing the 
services that were provided on the ground. Commissioners were not seen as being able to 
shape the system as a whole though, with the continual flux within their immediate and far 
environments being considerable barriers to sustained improvement (Emery and Tryst, 
1965). 
In many ways then, commissioners were the ‘subjects’ rather than the ‘masters’ of the 
change. This, and the limited impact that a small number of individuals can make on a 
complex system, is not unexpected despite the high expectations placed upon them in 
policy. Public sector change literature highlights difficulty of achieving change due to the 
multi-layering of governance arrangements, the influence of multiple stakeholder groups, 
and the uncertainty and expediency connected with democratic processes (Rushaw, 2007, 
Kuipers et al, 2013). The range of individuals who must participate in such change is 
considerable, all of whom (and indeed their teams, services and organisations) will have 
their own capacity and readiness to change (Kuipers et al, 2013). Furthermore it is clear 
from this study that the use of financial buying power is not by itself sufficient to overcome 
the inertia and active resistance to change that are currently preventing the achievement of 
the community based, well-being model of mental health care that is envisioned by higher-
scale policy actors. Commissioning generated forces for change are not consistently able to 
overcome the forces opposing them (Lewin, 1951). As the closure of the asylums in the mid-
20th century and move to more community-based teams in the 1990s demonstrate, this 
should not be taken to suggest that large scale change in mental health care is not 
achievable. A key lesson from these previous reforms is that there needs to be realism 
regarding what can be expected of a planning and purchasing process, and a sensitivity to 
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the danger that too great an emphasis on one approach (i.e. commissioning) will exclude 
other relevant and necessary sources of support (Gilburt and Peck, 2014).  
Conclusion 
This research could be taken as evidence that commissioning is not a satisfactory approach 
to achieving strategic change in mental health care, and that a new paradigm is required if 
we are to transform the lives of people with mental health problems. Clearly one major 
issue with such a proposition is what this alternative would be, as the arrangements pre-
commissioning were also far from perfect. Such as debate is however outside the remit of 
this article, and instead we would like to consider what is required to enable commissioning 
to be a more effective facilitator of change within the environment in which it operates. 
Procurement theory and research also tell us that it is hard to achieve good purchasing 
without having a robust procurement function that is able to design a process that reflects 
the services being bought and the market that is likely to supply them, and which can assess 
and positively respond to the connected risks (Lonsdale, 2012). In relation to mental health 
services this suggests that we need more, rather than less commissioners, and that they be 
trained and supported to fulfil their responsibilities. This training should include working 
with colleagues in other agencies and sectors, being skilled in managing internal processes, 
and understanding some of the deeper academic and practice based understandings of the 
power and political dynamics to purchasing and contracting relationships (i.e. the risks of 
poor procurement practice), and understanding how to lead change. Within clinical 
commissioning, the capacity and competence of the mental health related staff within CSUs 
also needs to be considered. A multi-agency mental health commissioning group would 
seem a necessity, and this could potentially be a sub-committee of the health and well-
being boards (which are responsible for health and social care commissioning as a whole). 
Having shored up the commissioning function, there needs to be a greater emphasis on the 
commissioning cycle as a whole rather than just the purchasing element. All the models 
mentioned in the introduction to this article stress the benefits of engaging patients, family 
carers, community groups and providers of all sectors throughout the cycle, and this was 
echoed by the participants in the study. In relation to public sector change, this equates to 
taking a multi-stakeholder approach to cope with the inherent complexity of the process 
(Crosby and Bryan, 2005). Involving those affected is more likely to generate support and 
reduce resistance, as the process undertaken has been shown to contribute significantly to 
growing readiness for change. Commissioners in this research appeared to recognise and 
aspire to such engagement but were restricted through their capacity and the disruptions 
highlighted above. Providers of all sectors will clearly prefer to win rather than lose 
tendering opportunities, but the evidence of this and previous (e.g. Windle et al, 2009) 
studies is that transparency and a fair playing field will help to sustain trust beyond a loss of 
funding. 
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The promotion of greater diversity of providers and the market incentives that they imply is 
undoubtedly one of the most divisive aspects of the current reforms (Powell and Miller, 
2013). Again taking a pragmatic approach that deals with the current state of play, the 
benefits of better market shaping would seem clear. At present there is a real danger that 
smaller TSOs, with their potential for engagement and innovation, will be lost, and that 
larger providers will dominate the market. Broader literature on supply chain management 
again emphasises that this is not a task to be underestimated, with a difficult balance to be 
struck by commissioners between guarding against opportunism through tight specifications 
and tight monitoring whilst ensuring that these do not destroy trust and the willingness to 
take shared risks (De Vries and Huijsman, 2011). One response currently being promoted to 
the demands of market diversity is for commissioners to give large contracts to ‘lead’ or 
‘prime’ providers and expect them to manage the supply chain on the commissioner’s 
behalf (Featherstone, 2012). Evidence from the Work Programme in England and this study 
suggests this is fraught with difficulty, and the basis on which it is assumed that providers 
will be able to manage a supply chain – and associated risks – better than a commissioner 
must be questioned (Rees et al, 2013). 
Finally, transformative leadership theories underline the importance of vision to inspire 
others to commit to change (Alban-Metcalfe and Alimo-Metcalfe, 2010). There was a 
general consensus amongst those interviewed to an overall vision of a mental health system 
that was person centred, integrated, community based and focused on mental well-being. 
However the translation of this vision into meaningful descriptors and measurement of 
outcomes appeared to be lacking. This resulted in providers not being confident that 
commissioners valued what was important, and a sense that energy was spent gathering 
data on the wrong things. This issue is not specific to mental health (see e.g. Miller et al, 
2013) but the answer for these services must surely lie within people who access mental 
health services and the expertise of the professionals that support them (Slade, 2006).  
To conclude then, whilst commissioners have some influence over their local mental health 
system this is substantially limited by pressures and powers out with their control. Going 
forward, English policy needs to decide if it will give them the tools, capacity and stability 
required to enable them to contribute to mastering rather than being subjected to the 
challenges that are currently faced.  
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i For the purposes of this article the following definition is used of the ‘third sector’ – ‘Organisations operating 
outside the formal state or public sphere that are not trading commercially for a profit in the market. This 
means charities and voluntary organisations, community groups, social enterprises, cooperatives and mutuals. 
Whilst these organisations are exceptionally diverse, they share a broad common theme of being value 
driven.’ (Available at www.trsc.ac.uk (accessed 30 May 2014) 
 
